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Since the adoption of the U.N. Charter in 1945, there has been almost
continuous debate regarding the provisions governing the international use of
force. On the one hand, the U.N. Charter Chapter on "Principles" prohibits
"the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state."' On the other hand, the Chapter on "Action with
respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression"
affirms "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed
attack occurs."2 Arguments have persisted because of the centrality of these
provisions to the maintenance of even minimum international order.
Two schools of thought have predominated.3 They are exemplified by
the commentary on the United Nations Charter, edited by International Court
of Justice (ICJ) Judge Bruno Simma,4 by a number of opinions of the ICJ
since 1986,5 and by the 2004 Report of the U.N. Secretary-General's High-
level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. 6 Despite the extensive
literature on this subject since 1945, no consensus exists.7
The following Essay surveys anew familiar issues in the international
law governing the use of force. It concludes that adherence to the
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1. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
2. Id. art. 51. On versions in other authoritative languages, see 1 THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 803 n.140 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter U.N.
CHARTER COMMENTARY].
3. J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
PEACE 416-20 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963). The Brezhnev Doctrine and Soviet attitudes
toward international law ceased to have policy relevance after 1989. See Nicholas Rostow, Law and the
Use of Force by States: The Brezhnev Doctrine, 7 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 209 (1981).
4. U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 2. The sumptuous binding conveys an
impression of authoritativeness.
5. Legal Consequences of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9);
Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161 (Nov. 6); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
6. Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World:
Our Shared Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
7. BRIERLY, supra note 3; see also CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE 95 (2d ed. 2004); Christine Gray, The Charter Limitations on the Use of Force, in THE UNITED
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR 86-98 (Vaughan Lowe et al. eds., 2008).
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requirements of economy of coercion-the principles of necessity and
proportionality-holds out the best hope that those using force in self-defense
will follow the laws of war while achieving their lawful objectives against
those who engage in asymmetrical warfare8 without regard to such laws.
II. THE DEPARTURE FROM REALISM
The Simma commentary on the U.N. Charter provides a starting point. It
sums up the argument as follows:
The UN Charter did not intend to exclude self-defence entirely, but restricted its scope
considerably. A comparison of the different wording of the two provisions [Arts. 2(4) and
51] illustrates that, remaining uncertainties apart, 'armed attack' is a much narrower
notion than 'threat or use of force'. If Art. 51 is thus read in connection with Art. 2(4), the
stunning conclusion is to be reached that any State affected by another States's unlawful
use of force not reaching the threshold of an 'armed attack', is bound, if not exactly to
endure the violation, then at least to respond only by means falling short of the use or
threat of force, which are thus often totally ineffective. This at first sight unacceptable
result is undoubtedly intended by the Charter, since the unilateral use of force is meant to
be excluded as far as possible. Until an armed attack occurs, States are expected to
renounce forcible self-defence. Because of the pre-eminent position of the SC [Security
Council] within the Charter system of collective security, the affected State can in that
situation merely call upon the SC to qualify the violations of Art. 2(4) as constituting a
breach of the peace and to decide on measures pursuant to Arts. 41 or 42. Only if and
when the prohibited use of force rises to an armed attack can the State concerned resort to
forcible measures for its defence.
9
Further, a state may not use force to end another state's unlawful behavior. ' 0
Simma's perspective resonates in international legal institutions. In the
last twenty years, the ICJ, for example, has developed a body of jurisprudence
consistent with the Simma view that has drawn severe, reasoned criticism11
8. See generally Michael N. Schmitt, Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian
Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW FACING NEW CHALLENGES 11 (Wolff Heintschel von
Heinegg & Volker Epping eds., 2007).
9. U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 2, at 790 (citations omitted). Thomas Franck
argues that state practice has made Article 51 more flexible than the drafters intended. THOMAS M.
FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 49-51 (2002);
see also Antonio Cassese, Article 51, in JEAN-PIERRE COT & ALAIN PELLET, LA CHARTE DES NATIONS
UNIES: COMMENTAIRE ARTICLE PAR ARTICLE, 1329, 1358-59 (3d ed. 2004).
10. U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 2, at 794. Some suggest that contemporary
international law bars one State from aiding another to suppress a rebellion. As a result, today, in the
event that we had to live again through the Spanish Civil War, we could expect to hear arguments that
assistance to the government of Spain would be unlawful. See Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity
of Military Intervention by Invitation of the Government, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 189, 251-52 (1985).
Under the theory advanced in the Commentary, one may well wonder if the U.S. attack on Afghanistan
in 2001 should have been viewed as legitimate absent such endorsement. After all, the "armed attack"
took the form of crashing civilian airliners into buildings.
11. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J.
1 (Dec. 19); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161 (Nov. 6);
Advisory Opinions: Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226 (July 8); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14 (June 27). All of these opinions are the subject of much commentary. For a few examples, see
Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International Law, 102 AM. J. INT'L L.
715, 720-22, 730-32 (2008); Michla Pomerance, The ICI's Advisory Jurisdiction and the Crumbling
Wall Between the Political and the Judicial, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 26, 36 (2005); W. Michael Reisman &
Andrea Armstrong, The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-defense, 100 AM. J. INT'L L.
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and led some governments, including the United States, to avoid the Court and
other international tribunals wherever possible. Among the difficulties with
this body of jurisprudence is the suggestion that there is some legally
discernible quantum of force that constitutes an armed attack and some legally
principled way to distinguish between armed attacks and attacks, whether
armed or not, that do not constitute "armed attacks" within the meaning of
Article 51. As a former Legal Adviser to the U.S. State Department put it,
defining an armed attack in terms of its gravity
would encourage States to engage in a series of small-scale military attacks, in the hope
that they could do so without being subject to defensive responses. Moreover, if States
were required to wait until attacks reached a high level of gravity before responding with
force, their eventual response would likely be much greater, making it more difficult to
prevent disputes from escalating into full-scale military conflicts.'
2
The Simma view states that the law requires the defender to absorb a first
strike. This proposition is unrealistic and, in the wake of the events leading to
World War II-Manchuria, Abyssinia, Rhineland, Spain, Austria,
Czechoslovakia, and Pearl Harbor-was known to be so in 1945. The
interpretation also is at odds with the notion, as Justice Jackson put it, that law
is not a "suicide pact."'13 It attempts to fix a definition of permissible self-
defense in a changing context 14 and appears to see the defender as more
dangerous than the attacker.
Second, the commentary's analysis of Article 51 is incomplete, ignoring
the text and structure of the U.N. Charter. Article 51 uses the term
"inherent"1 5 to describe the right of self-defense. Earlier writers stressed the
importance of this wording as meaning that the right predated the Charter and
that the Charter reaffirmed the existing legal contours of that right.t 6 Thus, Sir
525, 533-37 (2006); Nicholas Rostow, Wall of Reason: Alan Dershowitz v. The International Court of
Justice, 71 ALB. L. REV. 953, 972-84 (2008); Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the
Dualism of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 47,
80-93 (2008).
12. William H. Taft IV, Self-defense and the Oil Platforms Decision, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 295,
300-01 (2004).
13. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
14. Or, as was written at the beginning of the U.N. Charter age:
The Charter, like every written Constitution, will be a living instrument. It will be applied
daily; and every application of the Charter, every use of an Article, implies an
interpretation; on each occasion a decision is involved which may change the existing
law and start a new constitutional development .... No state can reasonably be expected
meekly to accept an interpretation of the Charter which it considers completely wrong,
however large the majority in favour of such an interpretation may be .... This remark
does not apply to an interpretation given by the International Court of Justice or other
bodies which may be authorized to give a binding interpretation.
Pollux, The Interpretation of the Charter, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 54, 54-57 & n.2 (1946) (emphasis
added). This is not to say that a "living" document means whatever one wants it to mean.
15. See supra text accompanying note 2.
16. See, e.g., LELAND M. GOODRICH, EDVARD HAMBRO & ANNE PATRICIA SIMONS, CHARTER
OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 345 (3d ed. 1969); MYREs S. McDOUGAL &
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 232-41 (1961); C.H.M.
Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 1952-f1
RECUEIL DES COURS 451. Reisman also ignores the significance of the word "inherent" as indicating a
recognition that the right existed prior to the Charter and is not impaired by it. Reisman & Armstrong,
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Humphrey Waldock argued that the Charter did not further restrict the
customary
general right of self-protection against a forcible threat to a State's legal rights....
Article 51 also has to be read in the light of the fact that it is part of Chapter VII. It is
concerned with defence to grave breaches of the peace which are appropriately referred
to as armed attack. It would be a misreading of the whole intention of Article 51 to
interpret it by mere implication as forbidding forcible self-defence in resistance to an
illegal use of force not constituting an "armed attack."'
17
Neither was Waldock impressed by assertions that Article 51 circumscribed
the customary right of self-defense articulated in connection with the 1837
Caroline case involving British action on American soil against supporters of
rebellion in Canada:18 the government claiming an exception to the general
rule against a first strike, even in self-defense, and on another state's territory
must present facts that "show a necessity of self-defence, instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation." 9 Waldock's reformulation of the Caroline doctrine
corresponded to the emerging technological context defined by nuclear
weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles:
legitimate self-defence has three main requirements:
(1) An actual infringement or threat of infringement of the rights of the defending State[;]
(2) A failure or inability on the part of the other State to use its own legal powers to stop or
prevent the infringement; and
(3) Acts of self-defence strictly confined to the object of stopping or preventing the
infringement and reasonably proportionate to what is required for achieving this object.20
Waldock concluded that one should understand that the law of self-defense
needs to reinforce the mechanisms of peace, not create advantages as a matter
of law for aggressors.
21
The world lacks a central police power or reliable U.N. Security
Council. Accordingly, how does one ensure that those who exercise policing
responsibilities, whether or not blessed by the U.N. Security Council, do so
responsibly and in support of an international law of minimum world order?
The answer propounded by previous generations was the balance of power.
22
supra note 11, at 532. Yoram Dinstein argues both that the Charter does not allow for the use of force in
self-defense in the absence of an armed attack and that
[t]here is no need to wait for the bombs to fall-or, for that matter, for fire to open-if it
is morally certain that the armed attack is under way (however incipient the stage of the
attack is). The victim State can lawfully (under Article 51) intercept the armed attack
with a view to blunting its edge.
YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 183, 187 (4th ed. 2005).
17. Waldock, supra note 16, at 496-97.
18. See generally R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82
(1938).
19. Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec'y of State, to Lord Ashburton, British Special
Minister (July 27, 1842), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/l 9th-century/br- I 842d.asp.
20. Waldock, supra note 16, at 463-64.
21. Id.
22. Martin Wight, The Balance of Power, in DIPLOMATIC INVESTIGATIONS: ESSAYS IN THE
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 149 (Herbert Butterfield & Martin Wight eds., 1966); see also
HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER N WORLD POLITICS 101-25 (1977);
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Today, under the hydraulic pressure of nuclear and other indiscriminate and
highly lethal weapons, the goal remains an international community governed
by a rule of law sensitive to technological realities and encouraging minimum
order,23 and the answer lies in the twin cores of the customary international
law governing the use of force, necessity, and proportionality.
III. THE HIGH-LEVEL PANEL
In 2004, the United Nations published the report of the Secretary-
General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change: A More
Secure World.- Our Shared Responsibility. 24 U.N. Secretary-General Kofi
Annan had called for the study in his first comprehensive comment on the
2003 U.S.-U.K. invasion of Iraq.
25
Where we disagree, it seems, is on how to respond to these threats [e.g., terrorism and
weapons of mass destruction] .... Article 51 of the Charter prescribes that all States, if
attacked, retain the inherent right of self-defence.... Now, some say this understanding
is no longer tenable, since an armed attack with weapons of mass destruction could be
launched at any time, without warning, or by a clandestine group. Rather than wait for
that to happen, they argue, States have the right and obligation to use force pre-emptively,
even on the territory of other States, and even while the weapons systems that might be
used to attack them are still being developed. According to this argument, States are not
obliged to wait until there is agreement in the Security Council.... My concern is that, if
it were to be adopted, it would set precedents that resulted [sic] in a proliferation of the
unilateral and lawless use of force, with or without justification. 6
Against this background, the High-level Panel's Report, adopted by
consensus,27 addressed (among other things) the law governing the use offorce that should apply to contemporary threats.
LUDWIG DEHIO, THE PRECARIOUS BALANCE (1962); EDWARD VOSE GULICK, EUROPE'S CLASSICAL
BALANCE OF POWER (1955); F.H. HINSLEY, POWER AND THE PURSUIT OF PEACE (1963).
23. But see Cassese, supra note 9, at 1336, which treats this view as presumptively misguided
and necessarily "m6ta-juridique." Other authors
soulignent justement que a) il n'est pas vrai que la norme coutumi~re en question
pr6voyait la l6gitime d6fense pr6ventive [but that is precisely what it did do]; b) l'article
5 1 a de toute fagon effac6 tout le droit pr6existant, sans laisser aucun espace A la l6gitime
d6fense contempl6e par le droit coutumier si ce n'est dans les limites ofi elle est
explicitement autorise par ]a Charte de l'ONU.
Id. The problem with this point of view is that it is wrong as a matter of history, including the history of
international relations under the U.N. Charter, and of common sense.
24. See Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, supra note 6.
25. Statement of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., 7th plen. mtg. at 2-4, U.N.
Doc. A/58/PV.7 (Sept. 23, 2003). On September 16, 2004, Kofi Annan said that the 2003 invasion was
illegal under the U.N. Charter. Iraq War Was Illegal, Says Annan, BBC NEWS, Sept. 16, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/3661134.stm. But see Nicholas Rostow, Determining the
Lawfulness of the 2003 Campaign Against Iraq, 34 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 15 (2004); William Howard
Taft IV & Todd F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq, and International Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 557 (2003).
26. Statement of the Secretary-General, supra note 25, at 3. The Secretary-General's speech
merits its own explication de texte as an example of selective understanding of the history of
international relations in the U.N. Charter era.
27. The fact of consensus is as remarkable as what the document said. Panel members
included persons with such diverse perspectives as Gareth Evans (former Australian Foreign Minister
and proponent of the Responsibility to Protect), Amr Moussa (former Egyptian Foreign Minister and
Secretary-General of the Arab League), Yevgeny Primakov (former Russian Prime Minister), and Brent
Scowcroft (National Security Adviser to President Ford and President George H.W. Bush).
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The Panel unanimously agreed that the older interpretation of self-
defense under the U.N. Charter was correct:
[A] threatened State, according to long established international law, can take military
action as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means would deflect it and
the action is proportionate. The problem arises where the threat in question is not
imminent but still claimed to be real: for example the acquisition, with allegedly hostile
intent, of nuclear weapons-making capability.
2
8
The Panel concluded that Article 51-the law of self-defense-ought neither
to be rewritten nor reinterpreted. It then took up the issue of preemption. 29 It
wrote that in the first instance a state should make the case for preventive
military action
to the Security Council, which can authorize such action if it chooses to. If it does not so
choose, there will be, by definition, time to pursue other strategies, including persuasion,
negotiation, deterrence and containment-and to visit again the military option.
For those impatient with such a response, the answer must be that, in a world full of
perceived potential threats, the risk to the global order and the norm of non-intervention
on which it continues to be based is simply too great for the legality of unilateral
preventive action, as distinct from collectively endorsed action, to be accepted. Allowing
one to so act is to allow all.
30
The Panel reaffirmed a status quo.
The Panel thus affirmed that the law of self-defense incorporated
anticipatory self-defense, provided the threat was imminent.31 It also set forth
a procedural response to the challenge posed by the events of September 11,
2001. If a state perceives a threat of the sort made real on September 11, it
should go to the Security Council for action before taking measures of self-
help. In short, a state in such a situation should exhaust its administrative
remedies before taking action. The Report would side with anticipatory
military action if a state believed it necessary to intercept an attack.
28. Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, supra note 6, 1 188. The quotation of Article
51 of the U.N. Charter in this paragraph omits the significant word "necessary" after "measures." The
situation created by Iran's nuclear program exemplifies the problem. Israel perceives an Iranian nuclear
weapons capability as a per se threat to Israel's existence because of Iran's hostility to Israel's existence
and its support of entities such as Hizbollah and Hamas that are committed to the destruction of Israel.
There is much talk at this time of Israel undertaking military action against Iran at least to slow down
Iran's progress toward creating a nuclear weapons arsenal. At the same time, the United States has made
clear that any nuclear attack on its allies of friends will be met with a maximum U.S. response-a
euphemism for the use of nuclear weapons. See Stephen Hadley, Nat'l Sec. Adviser, Remarks to the
Center for International Security and Cooperation (Feb. 8, 2008), http://georgewbush
-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/02/200802 I1-6.html ("As many of you know, the United
States has made clear for many years that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force to the
use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, our people, our forces and our friends and
allies.").
29. The U.S. National Security Strategy of September 2002 had highlighted "pre-emption" as
an issue. See THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA (2002), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-
020920.pdf.
30. Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, supra note 6, 190-91.
31. Contra Reisman & Armstrong, supra note 11, at 532.
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Apart from advocating a process, the High-level Panel recognized that,
at the end of the day, states would do what they believe is necessary.32 The
Panel endorsed above all the principle of necessity that has been at the heart of
the law governing the use of force.33 It also endorsed a contextual view of
necessity-reasonableness given the circumstances, including the procedural
circumstances, and the belief about the threat to be addressed. As Messrs.
McDougal and Feliciano noted more than forty years ago, this approach is the
"most comprehensive and fundamental test of all law, reasonableness in
particular context." 34 What is reasonable and who decides? 35 Enter the
multiplicity of commentators, observers, and decisionmakers in the
international community.
IV. NECESSITY AND PROPORTIONALITY: THE ANSWER TO THE
CONUNDRUM"
The principles of necessity and proportionality, informed by
reasonableness under the circumstances, offer a solution to the difficulties
posed by the present international context and the intellectual knots it offers.
They lie at the core of the international law governing the use of force. 37 This
idea is hardly original yet seems more obscure than necessary. 38 For example,
Israel's war in 2006 with Hizbollah or invasion of the Gaza Strip in 2008-
2009 generated commentary on the question of "proportionality"-were
Israel's actions in both cases proportional? 39 In a similar vein, NATO's
Kosovo campaign, which inflicted casualties without absorbing them,
provoked similar questions. 40 One may not like the goal of making one's
32. Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, supra note 6, 196; DINSTEN, supra note 16,
at 187.
33. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 16, at 217-18; Sloane, supra note I1, at 52 & nn.27-
28.
34. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 16, at 218.
35. In 1995, New York University Law School held a symposium on this subject, including
Nicholas Rostow, "Who Decides" and World Public Order, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 577 (1995).
36. As this Essay was being written, Thomas M. Franck published On Proportionality of
Countermeasures in International Law, which properly emphasizes the importance of subsequent
review. See Franck, supra note 11, at 762-67. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter makes much the same point
in asserting that the Security Council may end the period in which the right of self-defense exists by
taking "measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." This phrase ought to impose
an effectiveness test, but may not do so. The phrase does not receive much notice in the standard
commentaries. See U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 2, at 789-806; GOODRICH ET AL., supra
note 16, at 342-53.
37. See generally DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 208-11, 219-5 1.
38. See, e.g., Thomas Hurka, Proportionality and Necessity, in WAR: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 124 (Larry May ed., 2008) (discussing proportionality and necessity in the context of "just
war theory").
39. Franck, supra note 11, at 732-34; Sloane, supra note 11, at 96-100.
40. See generally the following debate in the American Journal of International Law:
Jonathan I. Chamey, Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 834 (1999);
Christine M. Chinkin, Kosovo: A "Good" or "Bad" War?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 841 (1999); Richard A.
Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 847 (1999);
Thomas M. Franck, Lessons of Kosovo, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 857 (1999); Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the
Law of "Humanitarian Intervention," 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 824 (1999); W. Michael Reisman, Kosovo's
Antinomies, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 860 (1999); and Ruth Wedgwood, NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93
AM. J. INT'L L. 828 (1999). See also Sloane, supra note 11, at 96.
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enemy pay a higher human cost of unlawful attack than the defender, but that
feeling does not make the action unlawful. Enemy tactics, such as using
human shields, may raise the risk of civilian casualties. That fact does not
make the lawful use of force in pursuit of lawful goals, including the
destruction of military targets, unlawful. Objectivity is hardly attainable in this
area. If one accepts the proposition that Hizbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in
Gaza share a goal of destroying Israel, one may reach one conclusion. If one
leaves those policy contexts aside and examines just what determined Israel to
use force in Lebanon and in Gaza-the casus belli-one may reach a different
conclusion. And, if one regards facilities with military and civilian uses (dual
use) as unlawful as military targets one may reach one conclusion about war
crimes just as one might reach another depending on one's outlook.4 1
The discussion involves an older and a newer view. The newer view
(which in fact is a revival of the much older concern with just war42) worries
about proportionality in the context of whether the military action is just, the
perpetrators/victims are innocent, and whether the goals are "good. ' '43 The real
legal issue, however, is different and less subjective: it has to do with whether
or not an action is reasonably necessary to put an end to the delict giving rise
to the right to use force in the first place. In this context, the goal is "economy
in coercion." 4 4 That, together with the distinction between military and
nonmilitary targets,45 encompasses legally permissible military action or other
forms of coercion and allows for technological differences among competing
forces.
V. CONCLUSION
The structure of international society and international relations has
changed little in centuries. Since World War II and the adoption of the U.N.
Charter, we have lived, as we did before, in a global system of independent
states.46 Its structure represents worldwide values. In the eighteenth century,
Montesquieu wrote that the law, in its most fundamental meaning, embodies
41. See Charles J. Dunlap, Targeting Hearts and Minds: National Will and Other Legitimate
Military Objectives of Modern War, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW FACING NEW
CHALLENGES, supra note 8, at 117, 117 (discussing the Crossed Swords monument in downtown
Baghdad as a target); W. Hays Parks, Asymmetries and the Identification of Legitimate Military
Objectives, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW FACING NEW CHALLENGES, supra note 8, at 65,
112-16; see also Franck, supra note 1I, at 733; Ruth R. Wisse, Now, About That "Proportionality",
COMMENT., Mar. 2009, at 27. This point is not made to excuse violations of the chief principle in the
laws of war, discrimination between military and civilian personnel and targets. See YORAM DINSTEIN,
THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 27-33 (2004)
(discussing the basic distinction in international law of armed conflict).
42. See, e.g., WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN, THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR (1981);
MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS (1977).
43. Hurka, supra note 38; see also Sloane, supra note 1I; Public Ethics Radio, Transcript of
Episode 7, Jeff McMahan on Proportionality (Jan. 25, 2008), http://www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/
01 09.html/_res/id=saFile 1/PEREpisode_7_Transcript.pdf.
44. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 16, at 218.
45. See DINSTEIN, supra note 4 1.
46. See BULL, supra note 22, at 38-40.
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the nature of things.47 This insight is worth recalling in the international
context because we do not have a world polity with a monopoly of force and
the ability to enforce a rule of law on a global basis.48 The latter task is left to
the states that comprise the international system. In times of stress, whether
threatened by states or nonstates, they will look to their ability to defend
themselves even if all they can do is call for aid. That is a reality the law, to be
the law, must respect.
47. CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS I (Anne M.
Cohler, Basia C. Miller & Harold S. Stone eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748) ("Laws,
taken in the broadest meaning, are the necessary relations deriving from the nature of things.").
48. In the international community, there also is no one authoritative source of international
law. See Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-Up International Lawmaking: Reflections on the New Haven School
of International Law, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 393,410-13 (2007); W. Michael Reisman, The View from the
New Haven School of International Law, 86 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 118 (1992).
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